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Abstract
In an important paper, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) showed that Taylor (1980)’s staggered
wage setting model does not exhibit persistence in inflation; they proposed a simple
modification, in which workers cared about the real wages of other workers, which solves
this problem. However, we argue that the key part of Fuhrer and Moore’s model is not
that workers care about the real wages of other workers, but that workers are assumed to
care about the past real wages of other workers. When that assumption is replaced by the
assumption that workers care about current real wages of other workers, the Fuhrer and
Moore model reverts identically to the Taylor model. We also show that a simple model
in which workers care about their own past real wages, e.g. because unemployment
insurance depends on past wages, as noted in Blanchard and Katz (1999), generates
negative autocorrelations in inflation.
We are grateful to Olivier Blanchard, Jeff Fuhrer, Kai Leitemo, Asbjørn Rødseth, Øistein
Røisland and Lars Svensson for helpful comments on previous versions of the paper.
However, none of these bear any responsibility for the content of the paper. Steinar
Holden is also grateful to NBER for the hospitality when this paper was written.
JEL Classification: E31, E3, E5.
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2In an important paper, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) showed that the standard formulation of
staggered wage setting due to Taylor (1980) implied price stickiness, but not inflation
stickiness. Fuhrer and Moore proposed a new formulation, which they referred to as the
relative contracting model, which exhibits persistence in inflation. Fuhrer and Moore then
showed that the relative contracting model is consistent with US macroeconomic data for
inflation and output, while the standard contracting model of Taylor is resoundingly
rejected.
Fuhrer and Moore made important points by showing the empirical weakness of
the Taylor model, and by proposing a simple resolution to the problem with a seemingly
reasonable justification. The model they proposed has been widely used in the literature
and in popular graduate text books (e.g. Walsh (1998), pp. 224-225, 460-467, 472-474,
and Romer (2001) pp. 295-296), as it is a convenient analytical representation that fits the
data. However, finding a formulation that is both empirically and theoretically satisfying
is harder than what one may infer from Fuhrer and Moore. As a justification for their new
model, Fuhrer and Moore argue that agents care about relative real wages, and not about
nominal wages. In this note, we will argue that this motivation is misleading. Fuhrer and
Moore’s model is based on agents caring about the real wages that other workers
obtained in the past. If Fuhrer and Moore’s model were modified so that workers cared
about the contemporaneous real wages of other workers, which is arguably the more
3reasonable assumption, then the model coincides with the standard formulation of Taylor
(1980).1
Fuhrer and Moore’s work may lead one to think that inflation persistence may
alternatively be generated by agents caring about their own past wages, which seems
more realistic than comparing with the past wages of others. Indeed, this is the idea of
Blanchard and Katz (1999, p. 73), who suggest “that taking into account the dependence
of the reservation wage on past wages holds a key to understanding the dependence of
inflation on itself lagged.” While not doing any formal representation of this point,
Blanchard and Katz refer among other things to that fact that unemployment benefits
institutionally depend on previous wages, suggesting that reservation wages will move
with lagged wages. We propose two alternative representations of their idea, and show
that in contrast to the presumption by Blanchard and Katz (1999), this idea leads to
negative autocorrelation of inflation.
The Fuhrer and Moore model
Consider the two-period framework used by Taylor (1980) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
Wages are set in contracts lasting for two periods. Contracts are staggered, so that half of
the contracts are set in each period. Let xt denote the log of the contract wage set in
                                                
1 This paper is not the first that questions the microfoundations of Fuhrer and Moore
(1995); c.f. Roberts (1998) and Taylor (1999). However, their arguments are different
from ours. Roberts’ criticism is that the model implies agents “are concerned about
having a large change in their nominal wage relative to inflation when employment is
high. Hence, the Fuhrer and Moore model “slips a derivative” relative to the conventional
microeconomics”. Taylor argues that the wage should be related to the price level over
the full contract period, a point already acknowledged by Fuhrer and Moore in their
appendix B.
4period t. Prices are a constant unit markup over wages so that the log of the price index in
period t, pt, is the average of the contract wages negotiated in period t and period t-1.
(1) pt = ½ (xt + xt-1).
Taylor (1980) assumed that contract wages are set as a average of the lagged and the
expected future wage contracts, adjusted for excess demand yt.
(2) xt = ½ (xt-1 + Etxt+1) + kyt k > 0.
Using (1) and (2), we obtain
(3) pt = ½ (pt-1 + Etpt+1) + (k/2) (yt + yt-1).
Defining the rate of inflation πt = pt – pt-1, and rearranging equation (3),
(4) πt = Etπt+1 + k(yt + yt-1)
Thus, as emphasized by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), in the Taylor model any persistence in
πt must derive from persistence in yt. In contrast, Fuhrer and Moore propose a new
contracting formulation where “agents care about relative real wages over the life of the
wage contract.” They propose a contracting equation of the form
5(5) xt - pt = ½ (xt-1 - pt-1 + Et(xt+1 - pt+1)) + kyt.
Substituting the definition of xt in equation (5) into the price index equation (1), yields
(6) πt = ½ (πt-1 + Etπt+1) + (k/2) (yt + yt-1).
To justify their model, Fuhrer and Moore (page 131) argue that “In the relative wage
specification, however, agents compare the real value of their wage contracts with the
real value of wage contracts previously negotiated and still in effect, and with contracts
expected to be negotiated over the duration of the contract period, equation (5). We
suggest that it is a priori more plausible that agents care more about the price-level-
adjusted value of their neighboring wage contracts than their nominal value.”
However, this justification is misleading. Presumably, the most natural
interpretation of “the real value of wage contracts previously negotiated that are still in
effect” is xt-1 – pt, i.e. the nominal wages set in the previous period evaluated at current
prices. In contrast, according to (5), agents care about xt-1 – pt-1, that is, the real wages
that the other group of workers had in the previous period.2
A further point is that the assumption implicit in (5) is also difficult to defend
theoretically. It is not difficult to explain why agents may compare their own real wage
with the real wage that other groups obtain at the same time, and many other studies
make this assumption (eg Bhaskar, 1990). However, it is harder to understand why
                                                
2 Later in the paper, Fuhrer and Moore note (p. 141) that defining preferences over xt-1 – pt-1 is “a
convenient simplification”.
6workers should compare their own real wage with the real wage other groups had last
period.
To explore the consequences of the more reasonable assumption, that workers
care about the real wage other groups obtain at the same time, we substitute xt-1 - pt for
xt-1 - pt-1 in (5). Furthermore, we also make the theoretically preferable assumption that
the real wage to be determined is the expected real wage over the contract period, and not
the real wage in the first period of the contract period (as also argued by Fuhrer and
Moore, 1995, in their appendix B). Thus, we substitute xt – ½(pt + Etpt+1) for xt - pt on the
RHS of (5)3, to obtain
(7) xt – ½(pt + Etpt+1) = ½ (xt-1 - pt + Et(xt+1 - pt+1)) + kyt.
However, it is immediate that (7) can be simplified to (2), that is, the standard framework
of Taylor (1980). Thus, the crucial feature of the model of Fuhrer and Moore is not that
agents care about relative real wages; indeed, the standard formulation of Taylor is
consistent with that. The crucial feature of the model of Fuhrer and Moore is that agents
are assumed to care about the real wages that other groups had in the previous period,
which is an assumption that is harder to justify.
Effect of past wages
From Fuhrer and Moore’s formulation one might also expect inflation persistence to be
generated if workers cared about their own past wages, and this is indeed the conjecture
of Blanchard and Katz (1999). One can think of various ways in which past wages may
7affect the wage setting. Blanchard and Katz refer to the fact that unemployment benefits
depend on past wages. In a bargaining setting, the outcome might then depend on past
wages, via the effect of the unemployment benefits, as well as on the expected real wages
of other workers. Observe however that benefits are linked to past nominal wages, while
the real value depends on current prices. Thus, workers that negotiate in period t had their
past wages negotiated in period t-2, implying that real benefits depend on xt-2 – pt.
Extending the Taylor formulation to include this aspect suggests a formulation as follows
(where 0 < γ < 1)
(8) ( ) tttttttttttt kypxEpxpxpEpx +−+−−+−=+− ++−−+ ][2
1)()(
2
1
11121
γγ .
Substituting (1) in (8) and rearranging yield
(9) ttttt kyxExx +∆
−
+∆−=∆+ +− 11 4
2
4
2 γγγ .
First difference (1) to obtain:
(10) ( )12
1
−
∆+∆=∆≡ tttt xxpπ .
Using the definition of πt from (10) in (9), we obtain
                                                                                                                                                
3 Retaining xt - pt would not change the conclusion qualitatively.
8(11) ttttt yExx +
−
+∆−=∆ +− 11 2
2
π
γγ .
Using (10) and (11), we obtain
(12) ( ) ( )1111 24
2
−−+− +++
−
+−= tttttttt yy
kEE ππγγππ .
Thus, this variant displays negative autocorrelation of inflation, the opposite of the
inflation persistence evident in data.4 The intuition for the negative effect is that high
inflation in period t-1 reduces the real value of the workers’ benefits’, and thus weakens
workers’ bargaining position. This dampens wage growth in period t, and consequently
lowers period t inflation.
Past wages may also affect wage setting if workers’ aspirations in job search and
wage bargaining are shaped by their previous earnings, as also suggested by Blanchard
and Katz (1999). One justification for this, proposed by Ellingsen and Holden (1998), is
that past expectations may affect wage setting via workers’ choice of durable
consumption goods. To see whether this idea may explain inflation persistence, consider
a formulation where the wage outcome depends on the real wages that the workers had in
the previous period, xt-2 – pt-1, as well as on the expected wages of other workers:
                                                
4 One can show that the first autocorrelation of inflation remains even if one solves out for the expected
inflation terms.
9(13) ( ) tttttttttttt kypxEpxpxpEpx +−+−−+−=+− ++−−−+ ][2
1)()(
2
1
111121
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Substituting (1) in (13) and rearranging yield
(14) ttttt kyxExx +∆
−
+∆−=∆− +− 11 4
2
24
2 γγγ
.
Using (10), (14) can be further rearranged to
(15) ttttt y
kExx
γ
π
γ
γ
−
++∆
−
−=∆ +− 2
2
2 11
.
Using (10) and (15), we obtain
(16) ( ) ( )1111 22
1
2 −−+−
+
−
+++
−
−= tttttttt yy
kEE
γ
πππ
γ
γ
π .
Again, we find negative autocorrelation of inflation, the opposite of the inflation
persistence evident in data.
Conclusions
It is very difficult to generate inflation persistence (i.e. positive autocorrelations of
inflation) in forward-looking contract model. Taylor’s original model generates no
autocorrelation in inflation. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)’s generates positive
autocorrelation. As this note argues, it does so by assuming that workers care about the
10
past real wages of other workers. Once one replaces their formulation with the arguably
more reasonable assumption that workers care about the current real wages of other
workers, the resulting formulation immediately reduces to that of Taylor. We also show
that if workers care about their own past wages, either because unemployment insurance
is related to own past wages or because the past real wage has a more direct effect, this
yields negatively autocorrelated inflation, the opposite of the empirical regularity.
This leaves open the question of how to generate inflation persistence in
contracting models. Recently, several different alternative types of explanations have
been proposed. Roberts (1998) and Ball (2000) have suggested models that relax the
assumption that expectations are rational. Jadresic (2000) proposes a staggered price-
setting model with a flexible distribution of price durations. Mankiw and Reis (2001)
argue that information about macroeconomic conditions diffuses slowly through the
economy. In a companion paper (Driscoll and Holden, 2001), we show that inflation
persistence may be caused by coordination problems associated with workers being
concerned about fair treatment, in the sense that they care disproportionately more about
being paid less than other workers than they do about being paid more.
11
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